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According to economic theory, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form of long-term 
international capital movement which is accompanied by investors’ intangible assets.
1 Examples of 
such intangible assets are the stock of technological knowledge accumulated by R&D or the 
accumulation of marketing know-how from past advertising activity, and it is expected that the 
recipient country benefit from such inflows. Consequently, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi, in his general policy speech to the Diet on January 31, 2003, promised to increase efforts 
to attract FDI with the aim of doubling the cumulative amount of investment in the next five years.. 
Although foreign investment in Japan has increased rapidly in the past few years, the FDI stock is 
still very small when compared with FDI in other developed economies. 
In spite of the importance of the topic, reliable statistics on and analyses of inward FDI in 
Japan are very limited. Moreover, in the absence of any meaningful empirical studies on this subject, 
some critics argue that Japan does not need more FDI. Like FDI in other developed economies, the 
majority of recent inflows to Japan took the form mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The critics fear 
that inward M&As are dominated by “vulture” funds seeking to reap quick profits by taking 
advantage of troubled firms (Nippon Keizai Shinbun-sha 2003). Another argument is that some 
inward M&As are in fact conducted to acquire advanced technologies (Werner 2003) – rather than 
transfer and employ intangible assets in Japan.   
This paper aims to examine whether such concerns regarding a potential “technological drain” 
have any foundation or whether Japan does indeed benefit from the transfer of intangible assets of 
foreign firms. In order to do so, we compare the performance of foreign-owned firms with that of 
domestically-owned firms, using micro data of Japanese firms in the manufacturing sector for the 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Caves (1982) and Dunning (1992) on the standard theory of foreign direct 
investment. 
  1period of 1994-1998. Our method of investigation is based on the following reasoning: if 
foreign-owned firms in Japan possess superior technologies than their domestically-owned 
counterparts, then this access to the parent’s intangible asset should manifest itself in higher total 
factor productivity (TFP). And in this case, Japan will benefit from inward FDI. There is, of course, 
the possibility that foreign-owned firms may enjoy greater productivity because foreign firms target 
domestically-owned firms with higher TFP for M&A investments. In order to take account of this 
possibility, we also test whether the TFP level of Japanese firms that merged with or were acquired 
by foreign firms improved after the investment.   
The paper is organized as follows: the succeeding section presents an overview of Japan’s 
inward FDI; section 3 compares the performance of foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned 
firms; section 4 tests whether the performance of Japanese firms improved after they were acquired 
by or merged with a foreign firm; section 5, finally, summarizes our results and argue about policy 
implications of this study. 
 
2.  An Overview of Inward FDI in Japan 
FDI in Japan is Very Small 
As is well known, FDI in Japan is very small compared to other countries. Figure 2.1 
compares Japan’s inward and outward foreign direct investment with that of other developed and 
developing countries. Japan’s accumulated stock of FDI is one-eleventh of that of the U.S. and 
1/28th of that of the U.K. Moreover, it is much lower than that in South Korea or China. The figure 
also shows that foreign firms play an important part in other countries’ economies as a whole, 
affecting macro-variables such as capital formation and employment. But in Japan, the role of 
foreign firms is very limited.   
Another characteristic of Japan’s FDI is that outward investment is much greater than inward 
  2investment. The growth in Japanese firms’ overseas employment far exceeds the employment of 
foreign firms in Japan, and is accelerating. Under current conditions, foreign firms cannot nearly 
compensate for the loss in jobs, investment, etc. brought about by the scale of Japanese companies’ 
moving abroad. Compared to other countries, Japan is being disadvantaged by not receiving the 
benefits from transfers of management resources through FDI. 
 
A Brief History of Inward FDI in Japan 
From the Meiji period onward, inward investment was limited for a long time and technology 
was acquired through foreign technicians, capital investment and licensing contracts. In 1945, under 
the direction of the American occupation authorities (GHQ), the market was made relatively “open”, 
but large multinational companies like Ford, General Motors and others did not foresee the rapid 
development of the Japanese economy and hence did not establish any major positions. Following 
the end of the occupation, the permission system was reinstated in 1952. FDI was difficult except in 
a few industries like petroleum that were essential to the Japanese economy. Scarce foreign 
exchange was strictly allocated to licensing and capital equipment importation. 
In 1967, three years after Japan joined the OECD, the first steps at opening up the economy 
were taken. By the 1980s, most manufacturing sectors were nominally open to FDI with the 
exception of the petroleum and the leather products industries. Nevertheless, FDI inflows remained 
negligible – for the following reasons: 1) In areas where Japanese firms were not competitive or their 
costs were high, extensive restrictions had remained in place until the end of the 1970s; by the time 
they were finally lifted, investors were discouraged by newly competitive domestic firms or high 
labor costs; 2) M&As were severely restricted until the middle of the 1970s; 3) imports were 
restricted until the 1970s, preventing the establishment of a forward strategy for investment to follow 
  3exports.
2 Another factor was the rise after 1964 of cross shareholdings as a mechanism for 
countering hostile takeovers and stabilizing stock prices. 
 
Market Access is Limited in the Non-manufacturing Sector 
Meanwhile, in some non-manufacturing industries substantial restrictions remain even today. 
Compared with the U.S., inward FDI in Japan has been constrained to a limited number of industries. 
Some industries, such as medical services, education, electricity, gas, and water supply, have been 
“sanctuaries” where almost no inward FDI is allowed. A comparison among APEC countries reveals 
the continuing closedness of Japan’s economy in sectors such as transportation, medicine, posts, 
temporary labor services, agriculture services, ship repair, electricity and gas, etc.
3 
Barriers against FDI often go beyond “national treatment” to more fundamental questions of 
market access. For example, market entry in areas such as medical services and education is limited 
even for Japanese companies. Also, the private sector is prevented from entering areas that have long 
been public monopolies such as the postal service. Difficult problems need to be resolved 
concerning whether competition is in the public interest before the FDI question can be resolved. 
 
The Recent FDI Boom in Japan 
During the second half of the 1990s, inward FDI in Japan increased substantially. Figure 2.2 
shows Ministry of Finance (MOF) statistics on FDI flows into Japan. According to the statistics, the 
                                                        
2 As often seen in the history of Japanese makers’ advance overseas, companies will first export to a 
market and then, after having established a presence, invest to better meet the needs of that market by 
moving production there. Since imports into Japan were low, there were few foreign companies that 
followed this strategy. 
3 For more details on inward FDI in Japan’s non-manufacturing sector, see Ito and Fukao (2002, 
2003).  
  4inward direct investment stock in Japan’s non-manufacturing sector has grown eight-fold in the last 
ten years. The total of FDI flows in the three years from 1997 to 1999 is greater than the FDI stock at 
the end of the 1996 fiscal year. In recent years, especially the number of cross-border M&A cases 
has increased considerably.
4 In 1999, AT&T and British Telecom jointly bought a combined 30% 
share of Nippon Telecom. Cable & Wireless from Britain acquired IDC (International Digital 
Communications) by a takeover bid, while GE Capital from the U.S. acquired Japan Lease. And in 
2000, the American company Ripplewood Holdings and others acquired The Long-Term Credit 
Bank of Japan. 
Probably the following three factors have contributed to the recent boom in inward FDI. 
1) In recent years, the Japanese government promoted important deregulatory and related measures 
in order to transform Japan’s economic system. As a part of this deregulation program, the Japanese 
government relaxed or abolished several regulations on inward FDI. For example, all restrictions on 
foreign ownership and on foreign board members in Type I telecommunications carriers (except for 
NTT and KDD), including their radio station licenses, were removed in 1998. In 1999, all 
restrictions on foreign capital and the appointment of foreign directors in all cable TV businesses 
were ended.
5  
2) As Figure 2.3 shows, there was a global boom in M&A in the second half of the 1990s, and this 
boom contributed to inward investment expansion. The growing volume of excess facilities and 
plant due to the lengthy economic recession also drove M&A in Japan, prompting both domestic and 
foreign investors to choose acquisition over investing in new facilities.     
                                                        
4 According to METI (2001), there were 129 investments into Japan through cross-border M&As in 
1999.  
5 For more detail on Japan’s recent deregulation measures, see Japan Investment Council (various 
years). 
  53) A third major reason was that the collapse of stock and land prices after the 1997 financial crisis 
in Japan, as well as relatively weak yen attracted foreign attention.  As firms failed to achieve 
projected earnings, they sold risky stock and cross shareholdings declined, making it easier for M&A 
to occur. 
This FDI boom has contributed to job creation in a number of industries, including 
finance/insurance, telecommunications, commerce, autos, pharmaceuticals, etc. Fukao and Amano 
(2003) estimate that employment at foreign companies in Japan rose from 485,000 in 1996 to 
694,000 in 2001. 
 
3.  TFP Comparison of Foreign-Owned and Domestically-Owned Firms 
In this section, we compare the TFP level and other performance indicators of foreign-owned 
and domestically-owned firms. Quite a number of studies, on various countries, have dealt with this 
topic. These typically show that labor tends to be more productive in foreign-affiliated companies 
than in domestic companies.
6 However, this is generally due to a greater concentration of capital 
investment; total factor productivity (TFP) analysis indicates that foreign firms’ productivity is not 
necessarily higher in all countries if differences in capital intensity are taken account of.
7  
A study that has examined the relationship between ownership and the growth rate of firms’ 
performance indicators (such as the capital-labor ration, real value-added and TFP) is that by Kimura 
and Kiyota (2003), which used the same data source as the present paper. Their study showed that 
foreign-ownership has a positive impact on the growth rate of real value-added, the rate of return to 
capital, and TFP. Compared with their analysis, our study is more sharply focused on the TFP level 
                                                        
6 See, for example, Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1998) on Indonesia. 
7 Ramstetter (2002) and Ito (2002b) on Indonesia and Ito (2002a) on Thailand have shown this 
result. 
  6as a measure of performance and measures TFP using a more sophisticated approach; moreover, this 
paper looks more carefully at the effects of M&As. 
The approach used here tries to deal with the following shortcomings of Kimura and Kiyota’s 
(2003) paper. First, they set the cut-off capital participation rate for their definition of foreign-owned 
firms at 10%. Their data on foreign-owned firms include all the affiliates of which one or several 
foreigners owned 10% or more in total. A substantial amount of stocks issued by top Japanese firms 
is owned by foreign institutional investors as portfolio investments. By setting their cut-off ratio as 
low as 10%, their data probably include such portfolio investments. Taking account of this risk, we 
use the 33.4% cut-off ratio. Secondly, they used the book-value of capital as capital inputs. As is well 
known, there might exist a huge gap between the book-value of capital and real capital stock, though 
the latter is more appropriate as input data for TFP analysis. The third shortcoming of their study is 
that they used value-added instead of gross output as their output measure. As Baily (1986) has 
shown, value-added-based TFP may differ from gross-output-based TFP, which is commonly used in 
theoretical and empirical studies. Fourth, Kimura and Kiyota derived real value-added using the 
value-added deflator of the SNA statistics, which is based on a relatively aggregated industry 
classification. Their approach risks underestimating the TFP growth of firms in high-tech industries, 
where output prices decline more rapidly. Compared with their approach, we use the more 
disaggregated deflator of the I-O tables. Fifth, they used a single hypothetical firm which was 
derived by taking the average of the manufacturing firms from all industries, as the benchmark for 
the TFP comparison. Since cost shares of each input take quite different values among industries, 
there is a risk of large approximation errors in their approach. We use a different hypothetical firm 
for each industry. 
 
Data Source and Definition of Nationality 
  7We use the firm-level panel data underlying the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure 
and Activities conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
8 The 
survey covers all firms with at least 50 employees or 30 million yen of paid-in capital in the 
Japanese manufacturing, mining and commerce sectors. We use the data for manufacturing firms. 
Our data covers the period of 1994-1998. After some screening of the data our unbalanced panel data 
consists of 68,641 observations (13,351 firms in 1994 and 13,719 firms in 1998).
9  
In the survey, firms were asked what percentage of their paid-in capital was owned by 
foreigners. We use this information to determine whether a firm is foreign-owned, setting our cut-off 
capital participation rate at 33.4%. Thus, our data on foreign-owned firms include all those affiliates 
of which one or several foreigners owned 33.4% or more in total.  
 
“Entry” and “Exit” of Foreign-Owned Firms 
Table 3.1, which is based on our data, shows how the presence of foreign-owned firms in 
Japan’s manufacturing sector increased in 1994-98: their number grew from 180 in 1994 to 244 in 
1998. During the same period, the sales of foreign-owned firms nearly doubled from 9.6 trillion yen 
to 18.2 trillion yen. 38 foreign-owned firms exited and 69 foreign-owned firms newly entered in this 
period.
10 43 domestically-owned firms in 1994 had become foreign-owned by 1998. We regard 
                                                        
8 The compilation of the micro-data of the METI survey was conducted as part of the project “Japan’s 
Economic Growth” at the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan. 
9 We exclude all observations with zero values of material costs, compensation of employees, and 
tangible fixed assets from our data set. We also exclude observations with an extremely high or low 
capital-labor ratio. By this screening process the number of observations declined by about 8% in 
comparison with our original set of observations. 
10 As already mentioned, the METI survey covers only those firms in the manufacturing and the 
commerce sector that are of a size that is greater than the cut-off level. Thus, our data on firms that 
  8these firms as merged with or acquired by foreign firms.   
The increase in foreign-owned firms’ market share was mainly caused by these 43 “M&As.” 
The total sales of these 43 firms amounted to 8.8 trillion yen in 1998, which is greater than the total 
increase in foreign-owned firms’ sales of 8.6 trillion yen in the 1994-1998 period. We will study 
these 43 cases more closely in the following section. 
 
Measurement of TFP 
In this paper we measure each firm’s TFP level using the method developed by Good, Nadiri, 
and Sickles (1997). Their method is based on Caves, Christensen, and Diewert’s (1982)   
“hypothetical firm” approach, which measures TFP as the gap between 1) the deviation of a firm’s 
output level from the industry average output level and 2) the summation of the deviations of the 
firm’s input level of production factor i from the industry average input level of that factor multiplied 
by the simple mean of the firm’s cost share of that factor and the industry average cost share of that 
factor for all the production factors. This index is particularly useful for a comparison of the 
productivity level of more than two firms in one particular period. However, this method is not 
suitable for inter-temporal comparisons. 
Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1997) overcome this problem by combining the “chain index” 
approach with the “hypothetical firm” approach of Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982). They 
achieve this by assuming a hypothetical firm for each cross-sectional comparison and then chaining 
the hypothetical firms together over time. The productivity index thus obtained is particularly useful 
because it provides a consistent way of summarizing the cross-sectional distribution of firms’ TFP and 
the inter-temporal change of distribution over time. Aw, Chen, and Roberts (1997), Fukao and Ito 
                                                                                                                                                                    
“entered” includes firms which expanded or changed their main business. 
  9(2002), and Hahn (2000) applied this approach to data of the manufacturing sector at either the firm 
or plant the level for Taiwan, Japan and Korea respectively.   
Using the industry classification of the METI survey, we divided our data into 59 
manufacturing industries. For each industry we measured the TFP level of firm f at time t by 
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where Yft denotes the output level of firm f in year t and Xift the input level of factor i at firm f in year t. 
Sift stands for the cost share of input i at firm f in year t. Upper bars indicate the average value of that 
variable over all firms in that industry. 
 
Data Prepared for the Calculation of TFP 
We used each firm’s total sales and cost of intermediate inputs as nominal gross output and 
nominal intermediate input data. We derived the deflator for each industry’s gross output and 
intermediate input by aggregating the deflator of METI’s Extended IO Tables at the 3-digit level into 
our 59 industries. 
As physical capital stock, only nominal book value data are available in the METI survey. We 
compiled a converter from book value to real capital stock using investment flow data in METI’s 
Report on Industry Statistics, which is based on the Census of Manufactures. First, we aggregated the 
data on investment in fixed assets for 1970-98 in the Report on Industry Statistics into our 59 
industries and then deflated them using the gross domestic capital formation deflator (plant and 
equipment) in the Annual Report on National Accounts released by the Cabinet Office, Government of 
  10Japan. We used depreciation rates of the JIP database at the two-digit level (Fukao, Inui, Kawai, and 
Miyagawa 2003)
11 and estimated the real physical capital stock for 1994-1998 by the perpetual 
inventory method. We used ratios of real capital stock and book value of capital reported in METI’s 
Report on Industry Statistics, which we aggregated into our 59 industries, as our converter. In order 
to derive the cost share of capital, we used capital cost data of the JIP database at the two-digit level 
(35 industries).   
As labor input, we multiplied each firm’s total number of workers by the sectoral 
working-hour statistics of the Cabinet Office’s SNA Statistics. We were not able not take account of 
differences in labor quality among firms, though it seems fair to assume that foreign firms probably 
tend to employ more educated workers. Our estimates of foreign-owned firms’ TFP level might be 
biased upwards because of this neglect of the labor quality. 
 
Comparison of Performance by Regression Analysis 
As a first step to compare foreign- and domestically-owned firms, we conduct a regression 
analysis in which firm’s performance is regressed on the foreign-ownership dummy. In order to 
control for other factors which might affect firm’s performance, we use industry dummies and year 
                                                        
11 The JIP Database has been compiled by those four authors, several economists at ESRI, and 
graduate students from Keio, Hitotsubashi, Tsukuba and other universities as part of an ESRI 
(Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan) research project. The 
detailed result of this project is reported in Fukao, Miyagawa, Kawai, Inui, et al. (2003). The database 
contains annual information on 84 sectors, including 49 non-manufacturing sectors, from 1970 to 
1998. These sectors cover the whole Japanese economy. The database includes detailed information 
on factor inputs, annual nominal and real input-output tables, and some additional statistics, such as 
R&D stock, capacity utilization rate, Japan’s international trade statistics by trade partner, inward and 
outward FDI, etc. at the detailed sectoral level. An Excel file version (in Japanese) of the JIP Database 
is available at <http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/bun/bun170/170index. html>. 
  11dummies as additional explanatory variables. Table 3.2 reports the results of this regression. Our 
main results are as follows. 
1腪  Foreign-owned firms have about 10% higher TFP and a 2 percentage point higher current 
profit-sales ratio. The latter result is consistent with the fact that the average of current 
profit-sales ratio of foreign-owned firms is substantially higher than industry average of all 
firms (Figure 3.1). 
2腪  Foreign-owned firms spend proportionately more on R&D per worker. They also have a 
significantly higher capital-labor ratio. Probably because of this, the labor productivity of 
foreign-owned firms is higher than that of Japanese firms. 
3腪  Foreign-owned firms’ growth rate of tangible assets was 4 percentage points higher and 
their real sales growth 1.6 percentage points faster than for domestically-owned firms. 
4腪  Average wages at foreign firms are 1.21 million yen higher per year. 
5腪  In the 1990s many firms conducted restructuring of their business and reduced their 
employment. Despite the pattern of labor saving (i.e. capital-intensive) production methods, 
we cannot say that foreign-owned firms reduced employment significantly compared to 
domestically-owned firms. 
 
Empirical Model of the Determinants of TFP 
As we have seen, foreign-owned firms tend to conduct more R&D and pay higher wage rates. 
Although their TFP level is significantly higher than that of Japanese firms, this difference might be 
caused not by the inflow of knowledge from their parent firms but by their own R&D activities and 
the (potentially) higher quality of their labor. In order to test which of the above two hypotheses is 
correct, we estimate an empirical model of the determinants of each firm’s TFP level and its growth 
rate of TFP. Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this regression are summarized in 
  12Table 3.3, while the regression results of this empirical model are reported in Table 3.4. The model is 
estimated by OLS using pooled data for 1994-98. 
Again, foreign-owned firms display a TFP level about 10% higher than that of Japanese firms 
even after controlling for other factors such as R&D intensity, the percentage of non-production 
workers, years passed since the firm was established, and firm size (sales) in addition to industry 
differences (industry dummies) and observation year. When we add firm dummies to the regression 
model, the gap between the TFP level of foreign-owned firms and Japanese firms becomes smaller 
(about 2.5%) but it is still positive and significant. 
The overall comparison between foreign-owned and Japanese companies shows that 
foreign-owned companies had 10% higher TFP, and higher returns on capital. Moreover, they 
displayed a higher capital-labor ratio and R&D investment per worker.  Probably reflecting the 
higher levels of capital intensity and technology, foreign-owned companies showed higher labor 
productivity and wage rates as well. Finally, foreign-owned firms enjoyed higher growth rates of 
TFP, sales, and real assets. 
 
4.  Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions 
As we have seen in sections 2 and 3, the majority of recent direct investments in Japan took 
the form of M&As. If Japanese firms that merged with or were acquired by foreign firms receive 
new technologies and management skills from their foreign owners, their TFP should be boosted 
after the investment. In this section, we test this hypothesis. 
 
Data Used 
The same data as in section 3 are used. However, it should be noted that our analysis is limited 
by the small database of only 43 cases and the relatively short period of observation (1994-98).   
  13As already mentioned, we use a 33.4% threshold level to designate the acquisition of equity 
by a foreign firm in a Japanese company as a case of FDI or “out-in M&A.” In the case of M&As 
involving only domestic firms – “in-in M&As” – we have had a threshold of 50% because of data 
limitations. We have 347 cases of “in-in M&As. 
According to our data, most manufacturing firms acquired by foreign firms in the 1994-98 
period were in the electrical machinery, transportation machinery, and chemical industries, while 
those acquired by Japanese firms were in the electrical machinery, transportation, and general 
machinery industries. Although more companies were acquired through domestic than “out-in”  
M&As, the combined sales of the firms acquired by foreign companies were almost twice as high as 
those acquired by domestic companies, , probably because the former were larger on average.     
 
Regression Results 
Using dummy variables to designate firms that were targets of foreign or domestic firms, we 
compare the performance of “out-in” M&A target firms, “in-in” M&A target firms and all other 
firms during the 1994-98 period. In this regression, we exclude data of firms whose activity is not 
reported either in 1994 or 1998.   
The regression results are reported in Table 3.5. In all the equations, we included industry 
dummies as explanatory variables. The results indicate that TFP levels among “out-in” M&A firms 
were higher than either domestic M&A firms or other firms, which was probably due to the transfer 
of management resources from the foreign company. In fact, M&As among domestic firms did not 
increase the target firm’s TFP. It should be pointed out, however, that the difference in TFP levels 
between “out-in” M&A companies, domestic M&A companies and other companies was smaller 
than the difference between foreign-affiliated companies in general and Japanese domestic 
companies.  This is probably because in the case of “out-in” M&A companies, little time had 
  14passed since the investment and the transfer of management resources and techniques to the acquired 
company had not been completed and/or fully fed through. However, as time passes, recent “out-in” 
M&A targets are likely to have characteristics of foreign-owned firms in general, that is, a greater 
concentration of capital and higher R&D investment, higher labor productivity and wage rates, 
higher levels of capital investment per worker, and higher TFP.    “Out-in” M&A activity therefore is 
likely to contribute to capital deepening as well as increases in research and development, labor 
productivity and wage levels. 
Table 3.5 also shows that “out-in” M&A target companies increase sales and expand fixed 
capital assets by more than other companies. Since “out-in” M&A companies have higher levels of 
productivity and profit rates, they aggressively expand production. It has been claimed that in 
contrast to greenfield investment, M&A does not bring increased capital investment or employment.   
But at least so far as capital investment is concerned, M&A companies are observed to vigorously 
expand investment.  As is well known, the economy as a whole realizes higher levels of TFP not 
only due to improvements within individual firms, but also as a result of a growing market share of 
such firms. Since that firms that have been the target of inward investment possess higher TFP they 
raise the overall TFP level in the economy.   
Employment growth in all three types of companies does not differ greatly. It cannot be said 
that restructuring by M&A target companies has reduced employment in Japan.   
Much of the “out-in” M&A activity took place in the latter half of the 1990s. Therefore, we 
only have a few years to observe any changes. However, in many cases it will take a long time to 
change management practices and put firms back onto track. In order to take account of this factor 
we also estimated a model similar to the one above but taking into account the number of years 
passed since the investment, i.e. (Dummy for firms which are merged with or acquired by a foreign 
firm)*(no. of years passed since the investment) and (Dummy for firms which are merged with or 
  15acquired by a domestic firm)*(years passed since the investment). The results are reported in Table 




Summary of Findings 
The overall comparison between foreign-owned and Japanese companies shows that 
foreign-owned companies enjoyed 10% higher TFP as well as higher earnings and returns on capital.   
They also displayed a higher capital-labor ratio, higher R&D intensity. Reflecting their higher TFP 
and labor-saving production patterns, foreign-owned companies showed higher labor productivity 
and wage rates as well. Foreign-owned firms tended to enjoy higher growth in sales and real assets. 
Firms that were the subject of an “out-in” merger or acquisition showed similar characteristics, 
i.e. they enjoyed higher TFP growth and R&D intensity and adopted more labor-efficient production 
patterns.  
When we compare “in-in” M&A targets with non-target companies, and “out-in” M&A target 
companies with non-target companies, the differences are not great. However, in the case of “in-in” 
M&A target companies, growth was observed in the labor-capital and fixed assets ratios. However, 
there were no improvements in TFP levels, labor productivity or earnings. Compared to “out-in” 
M&As, “in-in” M&A companies continue to expand in scale but without improvements in 
productivity or earnings. 
Further, there is no evidence that foreign-owned firms or “out-in” M&A target firms, despite 
their tendency to labor saving production techniques, reduced employment significantly compared to 
other companies. This is probably because the target companies become to have higher productivity 
and earnings and received robust increases in plant and equipment investment, and sales support. It 
  16is important to note that both greenfield and M&A investors undertook new investment and sales 
expansion in this manner. 
 
Policy Implications 
Inward FDI in Japan is remarkably small when compared to other developed countries, not 
only on an investment stock basis but also in terms of employment and fixed capital investment by 
foreign firms. Since the Meiji period, Japan has brought in foreign technologies by inviting 
technicians, importing industrial products, and signing licensing contracts, but FDI was strictly 
rejected or, later, seriously impeded. When pressed to liberalize capital controls as a condition for 
joining the OECD, domestic companies and their cross-shareholdings effectively blocked foreign 
investment until domestic firms had become competitive. In the services sector, investment barriers 
still successfully restrict significant entry, and even today there are many so-called “sanctuaries” 
where there is no foreign investment.  Further, the cross shareholding structure that has grown up 
since the 1960s almost certainly will continue to hamper foreign investment.     
The FDI flows into Japan observed in the second half of the 1990s were still tiny when 
compared with other developed countries. Yet, for Japan they represent an unprecedented boom, 
which was brought about by deregulation (mainly of non-manufacturing industries), corporate 
failures and falling asset values, reduced cross shareholdings and a boom in global M&A activity. 
However, the immediate effects of those deregulations on FDI inflows have run their course while 
the international M&A boom has stalled. As a result, inward investment is now stagnating. 
In order to promote FDI, the government has recently announced the opening of a “one-stop 
window” and established “special restructuring zones.” However, without major further reforms 
these kinds of measures will not be sufficient to achieve the government’s objective. On a balance of 
payments basis, the flow of inward FDI in the second half of 2003 shrunk by 42%. In the year from 
  17July 2002 to June 2003, the flow of inward FDI was ¥0.83 trillion. At this rate, in five years the total 
would be ¥4.15 trillion, falling way short of the ¥9.4 trillion needed to double FDI stock. 
The fact that outward FDI greatly exceeds inward investment means that Japan continues to 
lose out in the competition to attract important global companies - including Japanese companies - 
that would protect the high income of Japanese workers in a globalized world market. In order for 
Japan to enhance its competitiveness, it is especially important to have more effective policies 
promoting inward FDI including M&As, and to further deregulate non-manufacturing industries. 
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